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Territorial Restrictions and Per Se Rules-A Reevaluation of the Schwinn and Sealy Doctrines
1.

lNTRODUCilON

Under the law of antitrust, a territorial restriction is an artificial
limitation upon the geographic area in which an economic unit
may perform its business activities.1 There are essentially two types
of territorial restrictions. When the restriction is created by agreement between two or more economic entities performing similar
economic functions, it is said to be "horizontal."2 Two manufacturers might, for example, agree to divide their geographical marketing area into separate and distinct territories. In this instance, since

l. See generally A. NEALE, THE ANrrrRUST LAws OF THE U.S.A. 76-79 (2d ed, 1970);
Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman A.ct, 75 HARV. L REV.
795, 796 (1962).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 888 U.S. 850 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, Ml U.S. 593 (1951).

January l972]

Notes

617

the parties to the agreement are both manufacturers, their scheme
would be horizontal. 3 On the other hand, if the restriction is imposed upon one economic unit by another unit engaged in a different
but related economic function, the restriction is classified as "vertical."4 That is, an agreement between a manufacturer and its distributors or the distributor and its customers would be vertical because
both parties to the agreement are performing essentially different
activities.5 In cases involving vertical and horizontal restrictions, it
is arguable that the presence of the restriction reduces competition
in some important respects. 6 Nevertheless, the law views the presence
of each type of territorial restriction differently.
Horizontal territorial restrictions have traditionally been said
to be per se illegal.7 That is, they are illegal no matter what effect
they may have on competition.8 The legality of vertical territorial
restrictions, however, is still an unsettled issue. The past decade saw
a trend9 toward considering such restrictions per se violations of
section I of the Sherman Act.10 That trend culminated in United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,11 a case better known for its speculation than its reasoning. The Supreme Court, which ostensibly announced the per se illegality of these restrictions in Schwinn, will
have an opportunity this term to refine or perhaps revise its views
on this matter. The impetus for this review is supplied by United
States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 12 a case in which the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois refused to accept
a per se rule when considering the legality of territorial restrictions.13 It is the thesis of this Note that the Court should reverse its
decision in Schwinn, and at the same time reconsider its blanket
prohibition of horizontal territorial restrictions. As Topco illustrates,
the judicial declaration that horizontal territorial restrictions are
"naked restraints on trade"14 may only mislead the courts in their
effort to apply the antitrust laws to particular cases.
3. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 353-54 (1967).
4. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &: Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372 (1967).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &: Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847'
(6th Cir. 1964); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
6, See text accompanying notes 144-45 infra.
7. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 358 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See also Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1951).
8. See C. KAYSEN &: D. TURNER, .ANTITRUST POLICY 142 (1959); A. NEALE, supra
note 1, at 27-29.
9. Compare White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), with United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn &: Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
11. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
12. 319 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 402 U.S. 905 (1971).
13. 319 F. Supp. at 1042-43.
14. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).-
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE PER SE RULES
AGAINST TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS

The judicial aversion to horizontal territorial restrictions is a
long standing one. In the early case of Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, 15 the Court held that an agreement among competitors
to divide up their sales area was unlawful since it unreasonably restrained trade. Likewise, in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States,16 the Court found that an agreement by ball-bearing manufacturers to divide up the market was a violation of the Act. Since
Timken, horizonal territorial restrictions have automatically been
viewed as pernicious in their effect on competition and as "naked
restraints on trade" so that it is generally conceded that all such
restrictions are per se unlawful. 17 On the other hand, though the
law seems to be clear concerning horizontal territorial restrictions,
the status of their vertical counterparts remains in question.
While vertical territorial restrictions are not a new phenomenon
in the business world, the legality of such arrangements was only
recently considered by the Supreme Court. In White Motor Co. v.
United States, 18 the first case dealing with them, the Court took a
very cautious attitude. The United States claimed in that case that
defendant's resale price maintenance19 and territorial and customer
restrictions were illegal per se under section I of the Sherman Act.
The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio agreed with
the Government and granted summary judgment against White
Motor Co.20 The Supreme Court approved the lower court's summary disposition of the resale price maintenance issue, but reversed
the summary judgment with respect to the territorial and customer
restrictions. 21
In concluding that a trial on the merits was necessary, the Court
rejected the Government's contention that vertical and horizontal
restrictions are so similar that the per se proscription against horizontal restrictions should automatically be applied to vertical territorial restrictions.22 The Court reasoned:
15. 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
16. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
17. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 358-59 (1967) (Harlan, J,, dissent•
ing); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
18. 372 U.S. 253 (1963), noted in Recent Development, 51 CALIF. L. REv, 608
(1963); Note, The Effect of White Motor Co. on Exclusive Selling Arrangements, 17
VAND. L. REv. 549 (1964).
19. Resale price maintenance refers to an attempt by a manufacturer to set the

price at which independent retailers may resell his product. See P. AREEDA, Amxtjf 502 (1967).
20. United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562, 585-88 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
21. 372 U.S. at 264.
22. 372 U.S. at 263.
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Horizontal territorial limitations ... are-naked restraints· of trade
with no purpose except stifling of competition. A vertical territorial
limitation may or may not have that purpose or effect. We do not
know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these
arrangements emerge to be certain. They may be too dangerous to
sanction or they may be allowable protections against aggressive
competitors or the only practicable means a small company has for
breaking into or staying in business . . . and within the "rule of
reason." We need to know more than we do about the actual impact
of these arrangements on competition to decide whether they have
such a "pernicious effect on competition and lack ... any redeeming
virtue" ... and therefore should be classified as per se violations of.
the Sherman Act.23
Accordingly, the Court would "intimate no view one way or the other
on the legality of such an arrangement, for [it] believe[d] that
the applicable rule of law should be designed after a trial." 24 White
J.vf.otor could be classified as a neutral opinion since it merely postponed the determination of the per se illegality of vertical restrictions.
The neutrality of the opinion, however, is belied by the concurring25 and dissenting26 opinions. These opinions demonstrate
the diverse attitudes of the Justices toward the underlying issue. The
three dissenting Justices agreed with the lower court's granting of
summary judgment on the territorial and customer restrictions issue.
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Clark was critical of the Court's
refusal to adopt the horizontal analogy advocated by the Justice Department. He argued that the unanimity of action by three hundred
dealers in signing contracts with similar restrictive provisions could
be readily interpreted as a tacit conspiracy,27 and that these territorial restrictions were essentially horizontal and should be treated
as such.28 Furthermore, even if there were some distinction between
horizontal and vertical territorial restrictions, Justice Clark maintained the restraints were beneficial only for White Motor Co., not
the consumer.29 For the dissenters, the fact that there were no benefits for the consumer was sufficient to warrant the conclusion that all
territorial restrictions should be per se unlawful. This conclusion
23. 372 U.S. at 263, quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5
(1957).
24. 372 U.S. at 261.
25. 372 U.S. at 264 (Brennan, J., concurring).
26. 372 U.S. at 275 (Warren, C.J., Black &: Clark, JJ., dissenting).
27. 372 U.S. at 280.
28. 372 U.S. at 280-81. Compare United States v. White Motor Co., 372 U.S. 253,
275 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting), with United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 353-54
(1967).
29. 372 U.S. at 278. See generally Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L REv. 1419, 1427-32 (1968).
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was' believed essential to protect the "free competitive enterprise"
system.80
Justice Brennan was also concerned with the effect of the Court's
opinion on the "free competitive enterprise" system, but for different reasons. He commented in more detail than the Court on
the possible circumstances in which territorial restrictions would
be acceptable, and noted that
there are other situations ... in which the possibility of justification cautions against a too hasty conclusion that territorial limitations
are invariably unlawful. Arguments have been suggested against that
conclusion, for example, in the case of a new manufacturer starting
out in business or marketing a new and risky product; the suggestion
is that such a manufacturer may find it essential simply in order
to acquire and retain outlets, to guarantee his distributors some
degree of territorial insulation as well as exclusive franchises. It has
also been suggested that it may reasonably appear necessary for a
manufacturer to subdivide his sales territory in order to insure that
his product will be adequately advertised, promoted, and serviced.81
Having expressed his grave reservations concerning a per se prohibition of vertical territorial restrictions, Justice Brennan nevertheless
agreed with the Court's decision to wait until a more thorough
record was available before adopting or rejecting a per se rule. 82
Shortly after White Motor, two decisions in the courts of appeals33
espoused Justice Brennan's views regarding the applicability of a
per se rule to vertical territorial restrictions. The first of these, SnapOn Tools Corp. v. FTC,84 involved a territorial restriction imposed
by a manufacturer operating in the highly competitive hand-tool
industry. Snap-On argued that its territorial restrictions were justifiable because the number and complexity of its products required
personal demonstrations, which in tum necessitated close relationships between customers and Snap-On's dealers.BG It was Snap-On's
contention that without territorial restrictions it would be unable
to attract dealers because of the extensive sales effort necessary to
distribute the product.Bo Arguing that the validity of vertical territorial restrictions must be tested under the rule of reason, Snap-On
maintained the restrictions were legitimate trade restraints.87 After
30. 372 U.S. at 278.
31. 372 U.S. at 269.
32. 372 U.S. at 264.
33. Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. Fl'C,
321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
34. 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
35. 321 F.2d at 828·29.
36. For further discussion of the "free ride" problem, see Bork, The Rule of Rea•
son and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373,
430-38 (1966); Comanor, supra note 29, at 1432-33.
37. 321 F.2d at 827-28.
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extensive hearings, the Federal Trade Commission had ordered
Snap-On to abandon the restrictions on its dealers. 38 On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit, interpreting White Motor as an explicit rejection of
a per se rule against vertical arrangements, concluded that the minimal restraint on intrabrand competition was produced only to increase over-all interbrand competition.39 It further noted that the
possibilities of abuse through Snap-On's restrictions were limited
because of the highly competitive nature of the hand tools industry.40
The Sixth Circuit, in Sandura Co. v. FTC,41 also found a vertical
territorial restriction to be neither a per se violation nor a violation
of the rule of reason. Sandura had been accused by the FTC of
fixing resale prices and imposing illegal territorial restrictions on
its distributors.42 It had been a small but successful competitor in
the floor tile industry, but subsequent mechanical production problems led to consumer dissatisfaction with its product and to decreasing sales.43 The poor reputation of the product made distributors
reluctant to stock it even after the defects had been corrected.44
To regain its market share and to avoid bankruptcy, Sandura
offered distributors exclusive territories in which to promote the
improved floor tiles. 46 This incentive was all the more necessary
since distributors would have to bear the promotional and advertising expenses that Sandura itself was unable to finance. 46 The FTC
agreed that the territorial restrictions might have initially been
necessary to attract distributors, but contended that the restrictions
had ceased to be necessary since Sandura products were no longer
considered inferior.47 In addition, the FTC maintained that the
substantial freight charges incurred in shipping floor tiles were sufficient to prevent interterritorial, and thus intrabrand, competition
among distributors.48 Accordingly, the FTC held the vertical territorial restrictions to be more restrictive than necessary. 49
38. Snap-On Tools Corp., 59 F.T.C. 1035, 1059 (1961).
39. 321 F.2d at 831-32.
40. 321 F.2d at 833. The court also considered allegations that Snap-On had engaged in resale price maintenance. It found none practiced in one sales market in
which Snap-On and its dealers competed. In another market where the court found
that resale price maintenance had in fact been instituted, Snap-On and its dealers were
not competitors; the scheme was thus countenanced under state fair trade acts and the
McGuire Amendment to § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)
(1970). 321 F.2d at 834.
41. 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964), noted in Recent Development, 65 COLUM, L •. REv.
1115 (1965); Recent Case, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1679 (1965).
42. Sandura Co., 61 F.T.C. 756, 758 (1962).
43. 339 F.2d at 850.
44. 339 F.2d at 851.
45. 339 F.2d at 851.
46. 339 F.2d at 851.
47. 339 F.2d at 855.
48. 339 F.2d at 855.
49. 339 F.2d at 855.
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In reviewing the FTC's cease-and-desist order, the court rejected
the possibility that vertical restrictions were per se unlawful and
tested the restrictions under the rule of reason. 60 The court concluded that the vertical territorial restrictions were both reasonable
and necessary since they had kept Sandura from going bankrupt yet
had given Sandura no more than a foothold in the floor tile mar~et. 61
As was the case in Snap-On, Sandura's vertical territorial restrictions
were held to be permissible restraints on trade when tested under
the rule of reason.
The Justice Department, in spite of the adverse decisions in
White Motor, Snap-On, and Sandura, continued to advocate the per
se prohibition of territorial restrictions. It eventually presented the
Supreme Court with two cases to test the proposition. 62 The Court
resolved the issue with more conviction than clarity. The holding, rationale, and treatment of precedent in each case are subject
to question.
In the first of these cases, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 63 the Court
side-stepped the question of the per se illegality of vertical territorial
restrictions and rested its decisions on other grounds. A group of
mattress manufacturers had established Sealy, Inc., to oversee the
licensing of the Sealy trademark. In implementing its supervisory
role, Sealy, Inc., had imposed territorial restrictions on manufacturers
using the Sealy trademark and had set minimum prices at which
Sealy products could be advertised and sold. 64
The trial court concluded that Sealy, Inc., and its licensees had
unlawfully conspired to fix prices,65 but found the territorial restrictions imposed were "secondary, or ancillary, to the main purpose
of Sealy's license contracts," and hence refused to find a conspiracy
to allocate territories. 56 In arguments before the Court, both the
United States and Sealy assumed that the territorial restrictions were
vertical,57 and thus centered their arguments on the merits of a per
se prohibition of such restrictions. The Court, speaking through
50. 339 F.2d at 853-54.
51. 339 F.2d at 858.
52. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn 8: Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); United States v.
Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). A third case, Serta Associates, Inc. v. United States,
393 U.S. 534 (1969), involving essentially the same facts as Sealy, was affirmed per
curiam.
53. 388 U.S. 350 (1967), affirming 1964 TRADE CAs., 1J 71,258 (N.D. Ill. 1964),
54. 388 U.S. at 351.
55. 1964 TRADE CAs. at 80,107.
56. 1964 TRADE CAS. at 80,077.
57. See 388 U.S. at 358 (Harlan, J., dissenting). It was Justice Harlan's contention
that the failure of the Government to allege "that Sealy, Inc. was no more than a
facade for conspiracy to suppress competition," (quoting from Brief for the Petitione1·
at 12) suggested that the case was taken "out of the category of horizontal agree•
ments, and thus out of the per se category as well." 388 U.S. at 361.
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Justice Fortas, rejected this assumption and held that the Sealy arrangement was in fact a horizontal conspiracy.58 As the Court described the situation:
The arrangements for exclusive territories are necessarily chargeable
to the licensees of appellee whose interests such arrangements were
supposed to promote .... It would violate reality to treat them as
equivalent to territorial limitations imposed by a manufacturer upon
independent dealers as incident to the sale of a trademarked product.
Sealy, Inc., is an instrumentality of the licensees for purpose of the
horizontal territorial allocation. It is not the principal.59
Accordingly, the Court felt compelled to apply the test for horizontal,
as opposed to vertical, territorial restrictions in this situation. 60
The Court, however, was not precise in expressing the rationale
for condemning the restrictions. On the one hand, it is arguable that
the Court held the horizontal restrictions void because they were per
se illegal, as suggested in White Motor. 61 The Court emphatically
noted that the restriction was horizontal, asserting that the pricefixing, which was effected by the manufacturers' representatives on
the Sealy board of directors, "underlines the horizontal nature of
the enterprise." 62 Thus, the Court might have meant that the presence
of horizontal restrictions alone was sufficient to invoke the per se
prohibition. This is certainly the view taken by Justice Harlan in
his dissent since he felt that "[h]orizontal agreements among manufacturers to divide territories have long been held to violate the antitrust laws without regard to any asserted justification for them ....
[S]uch restraints are immediately suspect." 63 Justice Harlan found
nothing in the majority opinion to dispute his conclusion. It could
be concluded then that the Court believed horizontal territorial
restrictions among competitors to be sufficient by themselves .to invoke the per se rule, and that price-fixing was only an additional
reason why the Sealy restrictions should not have been condoned.
On the other hand, the assertion here that price-fixing "underlines the horizontal nature of the enterprise" might mean that the
territorial restriction by itself did not warrant a per se prohibition.
It is true that Addyston has traditionally been read to hold horizontal market divisions among competitors per se illegal. 64 Addyston,
58. 388 U.S. at 356. The trial court had found that only r1110 Sealy licensees would
have competed in a single geographical market but for the restriction imposed by the
licensor. 1964 TRADE CAS. at 80,080-81.
59. 388 U.S. at 353-54.
60. 388 U.S. at 355.
61. White Motor Co. v. United Stat~, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (dictum). See also
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
62. 388 U.S. at 356.
63. 388 U.S. at 358-59.
64. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957).
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however, was the prototype of a "naked restraint of trade." The restrictions were designed solely to restrain competition; 611 there was
no suggestion of an efficiency that the parties sought to promote.
When faced with a horizontal restriction that has an arguable efficiency-promoting effect the Court should be more reluctant to apply a per se proscription. Sealy may have been such a case. Because
the Court acknowledged that the territorial restrictions may have
served purposes other than that of insulating the parties from competition among themselves, it looked beyond the restrictions themselves to condemn them; it founded its objection on the fact that the
territorial restrictions were part of an unlawful price-fixing scheme.00
This aggregation of trade restraints spoke louder than any of the
proposed benefits from the territorial restrictions themselves. Under
established theory, the presence of this aggregation was enough to
condemn the components without an analysis of putative effects and
justifications. 67 Whether the Court would have been willing to strike
down the restrictions as per se illegal absent the price-fixing is far
from clear. Indeed, there is a statement in the Sealy opinion, prescient in many respects, that a market division by small grocers
pursuant to a plan to use a common name and advertisements would
present an entirely different case, not necessarily proscribed under
the law of horizontal restrictions. 68 The more persuasive the economic rationale for a horizontal restriction unencumbered by pricefixing, the less likely the Court is to apply a rule of per se illegality.
While Sealy and its predecessors thus appear to prohibit horizontal and vertical territorial restrictions that are integrated with
price-fixing, the Court left to the companion case, United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 69 the question whether vertical territorial
restrictions in themselves were per se unlawful. In Schwinn, the
situation was essentially vertical, for the manufacturer was responsible for the territorial restrictions imposed upon distinctly independent dealers and distributors. 70 Schwinn, formerly the nation's largest
manufacturer of bicycles, had revised its marketing plan in 1952 in
65. 175 U.S. at 240-41.
66. The district court had enjoined the price-fixing portion of the Sealy program,

This ruling was not appealed, but the Court stated that "the existence and impact
of the practice cannot be ignored in our appraisal of the territorial limitations." 888
U.S. at 355.
67. 388 U.S. at 357-58. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
593, 598 (1951).
68. 388 U.S. at 357.
69. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
70. 388 U.S. at 372. Although the Court suggested that the only criterion for clas•

sifying a restriction as vertical was that the restriction be imposed by the manufac•
turer and that the parties be distinctly independent, it has been suggested that an
additional criterion should be that the restriction be imposed for the manufacturer's
own benefit. See Bork, supra note 36, at _397.
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the hope of recapturing its dominant position in the bicycle market.
Under the revised plan, Schwinn offered its dealers the options of
purchasing its product directly from the manufacturer or purchasing
the product through an authorized distributor. In either case, the
dealer received title to the goods.71 In its dealings with the distributors, Schwinn made outright sales or utilized a consignment or
agency scheme.72 The distinction between the two schemes for distributing was that the distributor received title in the case of sales
while "title, dominion, and risk" 73 remained in the manufacturer in
a consignment or agency transaction. Under any of its methods of
distribution, however, Schwinn prohibited its dealers from selling
to anyone other than consumers and prohibited its distributors from
selling to anyone other than franchised dealers within their designated territories. 74 It was these prohibitions that were at issue in the
courts.75
In deciding Schwinn, the district court found the two restrictions
acceptable whenever Schwinn sent the bicycles to distributors on
consignment, but concluded that the territorial restrictions in sales
situations were per se violations of the Sherman Act. 76 The Supreme
Court substantially agreed with the district court's conclusions and
placed particular emphasis on the lower court's distinction between
consignment and sales.77 According to the Court, which again spoke
through Justice Fortas, the restrictions were justified when the manufacturer retained the title to the goods since then the distributor was
an agent of Schwinn.78 In these circumstances, Schwinn, not its
distributors, would be subject to the risk of loss on the product.79 On
the other hand, when the "title, dominion, and risk" was transferred
to the distributors, the agency argument failed. To control the distribution process once the items were sold to another party was to
71. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 327 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
72. There was a distinction between Schwinn's consignment and agency plans.
Under the consignment plan, Schwinn shipped the bicycles to its distributors, who
placed the products in their own warehouses. Under the agency plan, however,
Schwinn rented space in the distributor's warehouse and set the resale price at which
the bicycles would be sold to the retailers. In both cases, however, title remained with
Schwinn until the dealers had paid for the bicycles. See 237 F. Supp. at 328.
73. 388 U.S. at 380.
74. 388 U.S. at 371.
75. The Government also alleged price-fixing, but the trial court found no evidence
of it. 237 F. Supp. at 343. The Government failed to raise this issue on appeal. 388
U.S. at ll68.
76. 2ll7 F. Supp. at ll43. At trial the Government had argued that all of the Schwinn
distribution restrictions were per se illegal. When it appealed to the Supreme Court,
the Government relented and simply argued that the restrictions were invalid under
the rule of reason. 388 U.S. at 368.
77. 388 U.S. at 379-81.
78. See 388 U.S. at 381.
79. 888 U.S. at 380.
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work a restraint on alienation, a result the Court would not countenance. Accordingly, the Court approved the restrictions with respect
to the "Schwinn plan," 80 but not with respect to sales.st
While the Court condemned the territorial and customer restrictions on the facts of Schwinn, 82 the extent of the prohibition on
vertical territorial restrictions remains an unresolved issue. The
majority of commentators83 suggest that Schwinn should be interpreted as an unqualified adoption of the per se rule against vertical
territorial restrictions in sales cases.84 A number of courts have interpreted Schwinn in this manner.815 There is more than adequate evidence in the Schwinn opinion to support this reading. For example,
in Schwinn, the Court maintained: "Once the manufacturer has
parted with title and risk, he has parted with dominion over the
product, and his effort thereafter to restrict territory or persons to
whom the product may be transferred-whether by explicit agreement or by silent combination or understanding with his vendeeis a per se violation of§ 1 of the Sherman Act." 86 It is these words
that are primarily used to support the hypothesis that Schwinn stands
for a per se prohibition of vertical territorial restrictions when sales
have been made.
In contrast, it has also been suggested that the Schwinn decision
80. The "Schwinn plan" refers to sales made to dealers with the distributors acting
as agents only. 237 F. Supp. at 327.
81. 388 U.S. at 379.
82. 388 U.S. at 378.
83. Schwinn is perhaps most famous for the large amount of legal literature which
it generated. See, e.g., B. BoCK, ANTITRUST ISSUES IN R.EsrrucrING SALES TERRITORIES AND
OUTLErs (1967); Averill, Sealy, Schwinn and Sherman One: An Analysis and Prognosis,
15 N.Y.L.F. 39 (1969); Bridges, New Concepts in Customer and Territorial Restric•
tions-The Schwinn and Sealy Doctrines, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1156; Keck, The Schwinn
Case, 23 Bus. I.Aw. 669 (1968); Kittelle, Territorial and Customer Restrictions
Through Consignment or Agency-Schwinn or Sin1, 12 ANTITRusr BULL. 1007 (1967);
Sadd, Territorial and Customer Restrictions After Sealy and Schwinn, 38 U. CIN. L.
REv. 249 (1969); Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions After Sealy and Schwinn, 12
ANTITRusr BuLL. 1181 (1967); Note, Anti-Trust: Vertical Restrictions, 20 BAYLOR L.
REv. 237 (1968); Comment, Effects of Schwinn Bike on Territorial and Customer Re•
straints and Consignments: Will It Force Manufacturers into Forward lntergration1, 2
CONN. L. REv. 383 (1969); Recent Decision, 6 DUQUESNE L. REv. 162 (1967); Recent
Decision, 36 Gro. WASH, L. REv. 235 (1967); Recent Decision, 43 IND, L.J. 486 (1968);
Note, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn if Co.-Vertical Customer and Territorial Restrictions and the Sherman Act, 63 Nw. U. L. REv. 262 (1968); Comment, The Impact
of the Schwinn Case on Territorial Restrictions, 46 TEXAS L. REv. 497 (1968); Recent
Case, 21 VAND. L. REv. 142 (1968); Case Comment, 25 WASH. &: LEE L. REv. 121
(1968); Comment, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn if Co.-A Constructive Interpretation or "Do What I Mean, Not What I Say", 14 WAYNE L. REV. 593 (1968).
84. See, e.g., B. BocK, supra note 83, at 26; Kittelle, supra note 83, at 1022.
85. See Interphoto Corp. v. Minalta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 417
F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1, 8·11 (D.D.C.
1969); Fagen v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 303 F. Supp. 356, 360-61 (S.D. Ill. 1969).
86. 388 U.S. at 382.
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might be limited to its facts. 87 The basis of this argument is the following statement, made by the Court immediately prior to its declaration of the restraints-on-alienation test: "Under the Sherman Act,
it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an article may be
traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it." 88
This statement is susceptible to at least two interpretations. On the
one hand, it suggests that a manufacturer's restricting and confining
areas and persons with whom distributors may trade is alone a per
se violation of the Act when that manufacturer has departed with
dominion. On the other hand, the statement may mean that the
restrictions on sales are per se unlawful unless there is some recognized defense to the restriction. No such defense was present in
Schwinn, but arguably such defenses do exist. For instance, earlier
in its opinion the Court mentioned that the facts in Schwinn "do
not come within the specific illustrations which the Court in White
Motor articulated as possible factors relevant to a showing that the
challenged vertical restraint is sheltered by the rule of reason because it is not anticompetitive."89 The Court then enumerated two
possible defenses to the per se prohibition of vertical restrictions.
The first was a "newcomer" defense. 90 If a firm was starting or only
recently developed, it might initially avail itself of vertical territorial
restrictions to establish channels of distribution. 91 The second was a
"failing company" defense.92 If a formerly successful firm suffered
substantial setbacks in the market, as was the case in Sandura, the
company might utilize a vertical territorial restriction to regain its
lost channels of distribution. 93 Thus, if the facts of a particular case
placed the defendant in one of these categories delineated in Schwinn, the per se rule would be disregarded, and instead, the reasonableness of the restriction would be tested. Consequently, there could
be substantial confusion among the lower courts concerning the extent of the per se illegality of a vertical territorial restriction. This
certainly appeared to be the case in Topco.
87. See Lundburg, Schwinn and Beyond: The Survival of the Rule of Reason in
Vertically Imposed Customer and Territorial Restrictions, 30 MoNT. L. REv. 141, 147
(1968); Williams, Distribution and the Sherman Act-The Effects of General Motors,
Schwinn and Sealy, 1967 DuKE L.J. 732, 740; Note, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements After the Schwinn Case, 53 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 514, 521-23 (1968); Recent Devel•
opment, 13 VILL. L. REv. 192, 198 (1967). See also Comanor, supra note 29, at 1437-38.
88. 388 U.S. at 379 (emphasis added).
89. 388 U.S. at 374.
90. 388 U.S. at 374.
91. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 269 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
92. 388 U.S. at 374.
93. See text accompanying notes 41-51 supra.
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ToPco: THE UsE OF TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS
To FURTHER COMPETITION

The territorial restrictions in Topco had been adopted in 1944
by an association of small- and medium-sized grocery chains attempting to compete effectively with existing large grocery chains.04 The
inevitable trend toward mass merchandising was already appearing. 011
One reason for the growth in mass merchandising was the ability of
chains to generate large sales volumes. This permitted chains to
establish highly efficient purchasing organizations that utilized their
broad national base to extract the best products and prices from
food suppliers. 06 Growth was also attributed to the efficient and successful marketing practices that could only be developed by chains
that secured preferred locations for their stores, saturated lucrative
marketing areas with outlets, established local warehouses, and took
full advantage of local advertising. 07 Therefore, at the time Topco
was established, it was already evident that the smaller chains and
independent stores would have to develop practices similar to those
of their larger competitors or be incapable of effectively competing.
An additional practice resulting in a competitive advantage to
the large chains was the creation of private-label goods. Large chains
had discovered that they could develop their own line of quality
products that could effectively compete with brands already established rather than depend upon the national food suppliers for their
goods. 08 For the food industry as a whole, the creation of private
labels had procompetitive effects, for the demand for private labels
represented additional outlets in which the smaller food-processors
could market their goods. 09 At the same time, private labels meant
that the consumer could purchase a wider line of products, sometimes at lower prices.100 Potentially, the greatest advantage of private
labels, however, would accrue to the large chain stores, since their
private label, carried only by their outlets, induced customers to shop
in their stores. Thus, the good will established by their private label
extended only to that particular chain. 101
Although benefits from the use of private labels accrued to the
smaller manufacturers, consumers and large chains, the remaining
94. 319 F. Supp. at 1032-33.
95. 319 F. Supp. at 1034. See generally B. HOLDREN, THE STRUcrtJRE OF A RETAIL
MARKET AND THE MARKET BEHAVIOR OF RETAIL UNITS 10-17 (1960).
96. 319 F. Supp. at 1034. See w. MUELLER &: L. GARAJAN, CHANGES IN THE MARKET
STRUCfURE OF GROCERY RETAILING 113-14 (1961).
97. 319 F. Supp. at 1034.
98. 319 F. Supp. at 1035.
99. 319 F. Supp. at 1035.
100. 319 F. Supp. at 1035.
101. 319 F. Supp. at 1035.

January 1972]

Notes

629

participants in the retail grocery industry were placed at a competitive disadvantage. Without private labels of their own, small
stores and chains faced the loss of customers and sales to the larger
chains; yet, the successful development of their own private labels
would require the guarantee of a sales volume in excess of $250
million. 102 This large sales volume was necessitated by the great expenditures on advertising and other promotion essential to winning
new customers and keeping old customers away from the larger
competitors.103 This, however, was a sales volume that most smalland medium-sized chains were unable to achieve. 104 To reach the
economies necessary to market their own private labels and to overcome the larger chain stores' competitive advantages, the smaller
stores organized food cooperatives.105
Topco provides an excellent example of this phenomenon. In
the Topco Associates cooperative, the twenty-five members had individual sales ranging from $1.6 million to $182.8 million in 1967,
but their combined sales for that year exceeded $2.3 billion.106 The
combined sales of Topco Associates thus rivaled those of the largest
chains in the nation, though Topco's brands accounted for, on the
average, only ten per cent of each member's sales total. 107 By pooling
their ability to sell, these stores were able to achieve the efficiency
necessary to distribute private labels while permitting each member
to maintain independent pricing, management, and marketing policies.1os
Even with the pooling of their ability to sell, the members of
Topco Associates felt that the costs of producing a private brand
were prohibitive to a small grocery chain operating on a low profit
margin unless some assurance were given that local competition
would not arise in Topco goods lest one member be able to take
advantage of another member's costly promotional efforts. 109 Restrictions on distribution were thought to be necessary to attract initial
and subsequent members. One such restriction was the provision
that members would be licensed to sell Topco products only in designated geographical territories. This restriction had been adopted
in 1944 and was still in effect at the time the suit was brought.110
102. 319 F. Supp. at 1035.
103. 319 F. Supp. at 1036.
104. 319 F. Supp. at 1036.
105. For further discussion of the development and growth of food-purchasing
cooperatives, see STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMIC INQUIRY
INTO FOOD MARKETING I, 157-235 (f960).
106. 319 F. Supp. at 1033.
107. Only A & P, Safeway, and Kroger had greater retail sales. 319 F. Supp. at 1033.
108. 319 F. Supp. at 1037.
109. 319 F. Supp. at 1036. See :Bork, supra note 36, at 430-38.
110. 319 F. Supp. at 1036,
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While there were some rare instances in which two or more licensees
were competing in the same territories, for the most part the
licensing system eliminated any possibility of intrabrand competition
between the members.111
An additional restriction eliminated the possibility of intrabrand competition resulting from the wholesaling of Topco Associates' products by members to nonmembers. In order to wholesale
Topco products, it was necessary for a member first to obtain permission from Topco Associates, which, in turn, consulted with members that might be potentially affected by the wholesaling.112 Even
in cases in which permission to wholesale was granted, Topco placed
territorial limits on this activity, reducing a member's potential
profits from wholesaling.113 These two restrictions prevented any
possibility of intrabrand competition in Topco products.
The fact that these restrictions prevented all intrabrand competition provided the attraction to new members allegedly necessary
for the success of Topco Associates' plan. 114 However, it was this
same effect on competition that led the Government to allege that
the plan was per se illegal. It was the Government's contention that
because the restrictions substantially eliminated all intrabrand competition, they were a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act.11 5 Topco Associates, on the other hand, not only argued against
the application of the per se rule, but also contended that the restrictions were necessary to increase over-all competition in the retail grocery industry,116 and thus were valid under the rule of
reason.117
IV.

ToPco's

SHORTCOMINGS

In light of Schwinn and Sealy, one would expect a trial court
deciding a case like Topco to devote a considerable portion of its
lll. 319 F. Supp. at 1036,
112. 319 F. Supp. at 1037-38.
113. 319 F. Supp. at 1038. It should be noted tbat all but five of Topco Associates'
licensees agreed not to wholesale.
114. 319 F. Supp. at 1036.
115. 319 F. Supp. at 1040.
116. 319 F. Supp. at 1041. The economic benefits and harms resulting from vertical
territorial restrictions tbat eliminate intrabrand competition are highly disputed,
Compare Bork, supra note 36, with Comanor, supra note 29. It is frequently argued
tbat territorial restrictions are necessary to increase interbrand competition, and thus,
tbe loss of intrabrand competition is outweighed by tbe general increase in inter•
brand competition. See, e.g., Snap-On Tools v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963),
However, when such an argument is made, it is often difficult to discern whether it
is competition or the competitors that benefit.
117. 319 F. Supp. at 1041. Under the rule of reason the Court takes note of, among
other things, the procompetitive effects of the restriction and tries to balance them
against the harms that result from the presence of the restriction.
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thought toward distinguishing or reconciling these ambiguous decisions with the case at hand. In Topco, however, the court devoted
little time discussing the impact of these decisions.118 It succinctly
disposed of Sealy and Schwinn by noting that "[i]n each instance it
was clear that the effect of the agreements was to substantially eliminate or reduce competition among manufacturers or dealers who
might otherwise compete with each other." 119 Because the court did
not find a substantial reduction of competition in Topco, it concluded that the rule of reason, not a per se rule, should apply.120 A
closer examination of Sealy and Schwinn illustrates why the court
was justified in its approach.
A.

Sealy: The Relevance of Distributor Conduct

The Topco restrictions are never clearly classified as vertical or
horizontal in the trial court opinion.121 It is arguable that since the
facts in Top.co were similar to those of other cases in which courts
found territorial restrictions to be vertical, Topco Associates should
also be classified as vertical. 122 The parent company in Topco, as
in Schwinn and Sandura, was an independent legal entity engaged in
a different economic function from the other parties to the territorial
restrictions. Topco Associates performed distributive functions while
its franchisees were engaged in the retailing of grocery products. 123
If this were the sole structural element to be considered, it would
be vertical. Under this test, however, the Sealy arrangement would
also be vertical since it too was a separate legal entity performing
economic functions different from those of its franchisees. 124 Something more than the performance of different economic functions
and ostensibly separate economic entities is thus needed to make .
a restriction vertical.
Sealy suggested that there was an additional factor to be used in
categorizing a particular case as vertical or horizontal. That additional factor was the independence of the entity imposing the restriction from those on whom the restriction was imposed.125 It was
not adequate that the entity be ostensibly separate from the £ran118. See 319 F. Supp. at 1040-41.
119. 319 F. Supp. at 1041.
120. 319 F. Supp. at 1042-43.
121. In this regard, Topco differs radically from Sealy, in which the Court took
pains to distinguish horizontal and vertical restrictions for purposes of the Sherman
Act. See 388 U.S. at 352.
122. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Sandura Co.
v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th
Cir. 1963).
123. 319 F. Supp. at 1032.
124. See 388 U.S. at 353.
125. 388 U.S. at 354.
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cnisee. Rather, the entity must truly be independent in its decisionmaking from its franchisees.
This concern for independent decision-making no doubt explains
the particular emphasis of the Supreme Court on the overlapping
interests of Sealy, Inc., and its licensees. Of primary significance to
the Court was the fact that Sealy, Inc., was under the complete control of the mattress manufacturers who were also Sealy licensees.120
The licensees owned substantially all the outstanding stock of Sealy,
Inc., whose board of directors was composed entirely of licenseestockholders.127 Since Sealy, Inc., and its licensees had identical interests, the Court viewed the restrictions not as vertically imposed, but
rather, because they were "chargeable" to the licensees, as horizontally imposed. 128 Sealy may be interpreted as suggesting that not only
the difference in economic function but also the existence of independent decision-making is relevant in deciding whether a vertical
or horizontal rationale should be applied to territorial restrictions,
since the Court will be "moved by the identity of the persons who
act, rather than the label of their hats." 129
If the district court in T opco had been more concerned with the
identity of persons acting instead of the labels of their hats, Sealy
might not have been so readily dismissed. The licensees in Topco
controlled all the outstanding stock.13° Further, the stockholderlicensees extracted covenants from each other that prevented disposal of T opco Associates stock to an outside party without first
offering it to the remaining stockholders.131 This provision prevented
control from ever falling outside the hands of the licensees. Since
the directors in Topco were executives of the shareholder-licensees,
there is even more reason to believe that the territorial restrictions
were only nominally vertical. Even though Topco Associates did
have its own staff and employees,132 the tightly knit arrangement between Topco and its licensees suggests that its decisions should be
"chargeable" to the licensee-shareholders. Thus, it would appear that
Topco, like Sealy, involves horizontal, not vertical, restrictions.
B.

The Horizontal Per Se Rule and the "Competitors" Test

As suggested by the Court in White Motor, the rationale behind
a per se rule is that horizontal territorial restrictions are naked re126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131,
132.

See 388 U.S. at 352-53.

388 U.S. at 352-53.
388 U.S. at 353-54.
388 U.S. at 353.
319 F. Supp. at 1033-34.
319 F. Supp. at 1034.
319 F. Supp. at 1032.
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straints on trade that have no redeeming virtue.133 In Topco's cit•
cumstances, the appropriateness of a per se approach is questionabie
since the court found that there was, indeed, substantial justification
for the territorial restrictions.134 As the trial court noted, access to
private labels allowed small grocers the opportunity to offer con•
sumers a greater variety of products at lower prices.135 The Topco
arrangement had significant economic benefits in that it allowed
smaller grocers an opportunity to compete more effectively with the
giants of the food industry. In this respect, the facts of Topco were
significantly different from the previous cases in which horizontal
restraints had been found to exist. In Timken, 136 Addyston, 131 and
Sealy, 138 the Court found little economic justification for the par•
ticular restrictions. The Court has not had occasion to strike down
a horizontal scheme that is truly procompetitive in its effect. The
horizontal restraints it has so far encountered have been naked restraints aimed solely at reducing competition or restrictions that
have been infected by their association with price-fixing.139
There is yet another manner in which Topco differs from the
true horizontal restraint case. In Topco it is doubtful that the court
was considering a case involving competitors. Topco members were
located throughout thirty-three states but few members had stores
in the same marketing areas.140 This fact would suggest that Topco's
licensees, in general, were not actual competitors. The restrictions
in the other horizontal cases, on the other hand, were among parties
who were either in direct competition or would have been but for
the restraint. In Sealy, for example, the trial court found that there
were occasions when only the licensing restrictions ancillary to the
use of the trademark prevented particular manufacturers from being
actual competitors.141 Likewise, in Timken, the Court appeared to
believe that the cartel agreements were used to prevent competition
that was imminent.142 Again in Addyston, it appeared that the parties
to the agreement were competitors. In Judge Taft's words, the agree133. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
134. For a discussion of the rules applicable in horizontal restraint situations, see
text accompanying notes 64-68 supra.
135. 31!) F. Supp. at 1035.
136. See 341 U.S. at 598-99.
137. See 175 U.S. at 243.
138. See 388 U.S. at 354.
139. See 388 U.S. at 375-76.
140. 319 F. Supp. at 1033, 1042.
141. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 1964 TRADE CAs. ,r 71,258, at 80,081 (N.D. m.
1964), afjd., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
142. See 341 U.S. at 595-96.

634

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 70:616

ment "was· tempered by the fear of competition." 143 It would seem
that· the so-called per se prohibition against horizontal territorial
restrictions is actually just a per se prohibition against territorial restrictions among competitors.
This distinction benv-een competitors and noncompetitors finds
support not only in the case law, but in economic theory as well.
The objection that .may be raised to territorial restrictions among
competitors is that such restrictions tend to enhance prices.144 Agreements to create territorial restrictions may in effect be agreements
to create geographical monopolies. Even when there are substitutes
for the products that the collaborators produce, the same conclusion
is justified. Assuming there is no monopoly, it would appear that
each party would have less market power to fix its initial price, even
when aided by the agreement. Nevertheless, it also seems clear that
the agreement to divide up the market will still give each party more
market power than he previously possessed. With the aid of the
agreement, each competitor is faced by what probably will be a substantially reduced number of competitors. This means that there
will be less pressure on each manufacturer or retailer to reduce his
prices to respond to competition.145
It might be argued, in opposition to the application of the per se
rule, that the agreement may be necessary to promote some goal other
than that of restraining competition. For example, in Sealy and Timken, it was argued that the territorial restrictions were essential to the
proper promotion of the particular trademark. 146 While in both
cases the Court was unmoved by the argument, there may be instances when such agreements will have advantageous effects on
competition.147 However, as several commentators have suggested,
when restrictions as a class have an adverse effect on competition,
it may be better to sacrifice the legality of some agreements that may
produce limited benefits in order to obtain the advantages of a per se
rule. 148 This seems especially true for horizontal restrictions among
competitors since harm to competition will certainly result and the
potential advantages of the restriction are most often speculative.
When the restriction exists between parties who are not at the
143. United States v. Addyston Pipe &: Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 292 (6th Cir. 1898),
afjd., 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
144. See Bork, supra note 36, at 393-94. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
145. See generally Bork, supra note 36, at 391-97.
146. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 356 n.3 (1967); Timken Roller Dear•
ing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951).
147. A territorial restriction could mean reduced selling costs, and thus lower
prices. See Bork, supra note 36, at 398-405.
148. C. KAYSEN &: D. TURNER, supra note 8, at 142. See also A. NEALE, supra note I,
at 436-37.
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outset actual or potential competitors,149 the restriction eliminates
little competition from a given geographic area. Indeed, it may often
be the case that the restriction is part of a horizontal agreement
that provides a procompetitive benefit, such as increased efficiency.
In Topco's circumstances, smaller stores were given the opportunity
to compete with the large national chains. Without the restrictions
as an inducement, the stores would not have been able to form the
cooperative with its attendant economies of scale. In this respect, the
restriction was truly ancillary to an agreement furthering competition. And if at some later time the restriction did prevent some
intraband competition,150 it restrained a competition that had become possible only because the Topco arrangement itself had been
so successful and had facilitated the expansion of the member stores
into new market areas. Under a rule of reason analysis the restrictions in Topco should in fact be validated.

C.

Schwinn Revisted

If the Court does use the rule of reason to test horizontal restrictions among noncompetitors, it would create some question whether
vertical territorial restrictions should continue to be considered per
se illegal, as was suggested in Schwinn. 151 The same ·considerations
that justify use of the rule of reason in cases of horizontal territorial
restrictions among noncompetitors apply to vertical territorial restrictions.
The reason for the rejection of the per se rule for horizontal
restrictions among noncompetitors is that there is no clear indication
that these restrictions would have an adverse effect on competition.
Likewise, it is also unclear whether vertical territorial restrictions,
in general, would tend to affect prices. When the product in question is unique, so that territorial restrictions create a monopoly,
perhaps there may be some justification for declaring the restrictions
to be unlawful. 152 In other more common situations, when there are
149. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964), in which the
Court enumerated several criteria for trial courts to consider in determining whether
two parties are potential competitors. The criteria included "[t]he number and power
of the competitors in the relevant market; the background of their growth ••• the
relationship of their lines of commerce .•• the setting in which the joint venture was
created; the reasons and necessities for its existence ••• the potential power of the
joint venture in the relevant market." 378 U.S. at 176-77.
150. The trial court found that several stores expanded into other licensees' territories even though the new outlets were not allowed to carry Topco products. The
court further noted that many licensees left Topco when they were large enough to
develop their own private labels. 319 F. Supp. at 1042.
151. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
152. In these circumstances, a territorial restriction gives the retailer the opportunity
to set a monopoly price and misallocate resources. However, if the manufacturer could
have vertically integrated and sold his products at retail, he too would sell at the
monopoly. price. Thus, the price at which retailers protected ,by territo!ial, restrictions
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several substitute products, the effect of such restrictions is less
certain. In fact, two different schools of economic thought have
developed on this issue. On the one hand, Professor Comanor argues
that vertical territorial restrictions lead to a serious misallocation of
resources.153 The assumption behind Professor Comanor's argument
is that the consumer should be the one to decide how many manufacturers should sell a particular product in a given area or how
much service should be provided by the dealer; 154 if services supplied are less than that demanded, the price should rise until demand equals supply. Likewise, if supply exceeds demand, prices
should drop until supply reaches the new equilibrium level. Thus,
Professor Comanor seems to suggest that by allowing consumers and
not manufacturers to decide how much of a given product should be
supplied to a given geographic market, the long-run effect should
be a better allocation of resources.
On the other side of this debate, Professor Bork argues that it
should be the manufacturer who decides how his product should
be distributed to consumers, for such a decision can be made
without misallocating resources.155 It is his contention that vertical
territorial restrictions are a source of efficiency in themselves. 156 According to his theory, the manufacturer has the choice either to
integrate vertically or set up an alternative system of distribution.
If he chooses the latter method, then this is because it appears to
the manufacturer to be the more efficient approach.167 There may
also be cases when the manufacturer ivill not have the choice between distribution methods. In these instances, vertical territorial
restrictions may allow him to attract distributors by offering them
exclusive territories in exchange for the use of their capital for expenditures, such as advertising, which the manufacturer himself
might not be able to finance. 158 Professor Bork concludes that there
sell may not be higher than the price without the restrictions had the manufacturer
integrated vertically. The use of vertical territorial restrictions would only mean that
the monopoly profit might be divided between the retailers and the manufacturer.
See Bork, supra note 36, at 402-03.
153. See Comanor, supra note 29.
154. Id. at 423-25.
155. See Bork, supra note 36, at 397-405.
156. See id. at 403.
157. See id. at 403. Note that under Bork's theory, the consumer still has the
final choice regarding resource allocation. If the distribution method chosen by a
manufacturer is less efficient and thus more costly, the manufacturer will receive lower
profits if he keeps his wholesale price constant. If he raises his wholesale price, he
faces the possibility that retailers will refuse to carry his product unless they can pass
on the price increase to customers. If this occurs, then total sales of the manufacturer's
product will decrease because some consumers will not pay the higher price. Thus,
the consumer's responsiveness to changes in price ensures that the manufacturer will
want to choose the most efficient distribution system. Id. at 397-429.
158, See, e.g., Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964). Cf, Packard Motor
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are numerous instances in which vertical territorial restric~ions are
essential for the promotion of interband competition .. Accordingly,
Professor Bork argues that vertical restrictions should be per se
legal.150
The Bork and Comanor theories reflect different views on the
implementation of antitrust policy. The merits of both have been
substantially debated.160 The extent of disagreement between the
two schools should in itself be sufficient evidence that vertical
territorial restrictions should not be per se illegal. If economists
do not agree on the desirability of these restrictions, then the certainty to be obtained by use of the per se rule may be obtained. at
great economic cost. It will be remembered that horizontal territorial restrictions among competitors were prohibited because in
every instance there would be some tendency to enhance prices and
misallocate resources.161 For vertical territorial restrictions, it is
doubtful whether such an adverse effect will always occur. On the
contrary, there may be many instances in which such restrictions
lower prices and produce a more efficient allocation of resources for
consumers.162 This is particularly true when there is intense interbrand competition. In these instances, the absence of vertical restrictions would mean wasted sales effort among dealers carrying
the same product.163 The disagreement among economists concerning the effect of vertical restrictions on resource allocation would
provide the Court with a sufficient justification for overruling
Schwinn. However, there are two additional reasons why the Court
should adopt this approach and overrule Schwinn.
Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 822 (1957).
159. Bork, supra note 36, at 475.
160. See, e.g., Stone, Closed Territorial Distribution: An Opening Question in the
Sherman Act, 30 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 286 (1963); Note, supra note I. For a broader discussion of Professor Bork's attitude toward vertical restrictions and antitrust policy,
see Blake &: Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 377 (1965); Blake 8:
Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 422 (1965);
Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I, 65 CoLUM. L. REV. 401 (1965); Bork &: Bowman,
Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: II, 1i5 Coun-r. L. R.Ev. 417 (1965) .
. 161. See text accompanying notes 144-45 supra.
162. Cf. Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957), in which the court held that an agreement by an automobile manufacturer to limit his dealerships in a given area to one
outlet was a reasonable restraint on trade. The outlet had been losing money and
requested that the manufacturer give it an exclusive dealership. The only reason for
the request, assuming there was no specific intent to drive a competitor out of business,
was that it viewed an exclusive franchise as essential ,to achieve the economies of
scale necessary to make a profit. Since it is doubtful that the outlet could have successfuIIy raised prices because of tpe interbrand competition in the auto· industry,
there seems to be a s1:1bstantial possibility that the economies would be passed on to
the. consumer in the fQrm of Im-.:~ prices._
163. See generally Bork, supra note 36, at 430-52.
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First; ·there were simply no legal precedents to support the con•
tention that all vertical territorial restrictions in sales cases should
be per se illegal. It was only in 1963 that the Court heard White
Motor, the first case to question the legality of these restrictions.
Even then, the Court refused to accept the Government's contention
that they were so pernicious that they should be per se illegal. The
Court decided to wait until it had the opportunity to learn more
about the "business stuff" behind vertical territorial restrictions
before reaching a conclusion concerning their legality. 184 Four years
later, when Schwinn came before the Court, the per se rule for vertical territorial restrictions was announced even though the Court
had heard no cases involving this type of restriction since White
.Motor.165 The Court, in announcing the Schwinn rule, ignored its
own advice and consequently promulgated a rule that is neither
desirable under economic theory nor justified by legal precedent.
The Court should reject the Schwinn rule, and at the least, wait
until it has reviewed more vertical territorial restrictions before
making a decision regarding the legality of these restraints.
There is a further reason why the Court should reverse its present position on vertical territorial restrictions. The primary justification for the Court's holding in Schwinn seems to be the ancient
rule against restraints on alienation. 166 The Court appears to have
adopted this rationale because ·it had been used previously in Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 161 to prohibit another
vertical restriction, resale price maintenance. The Court's use of the
restraint on alienation theory to justify a per se rule against
such vertical price-fixing has been subject to criticism.168 Even if
vertical price-fixing should be per se illegal, it does not follow that vertical territorial restrictions should be subject to an inflexible per se rule. As commentators have noted, there may be
significant differences between the two types of restrictions. In the
case of resale price maintenance by a manufacturer, it appears that
the restriction will affect competition because retailers carrying that
product cannot competitively price against other retailers carrying
164. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
165. The only. other major cases involving vertical territorial restrictions, Snap-On
'fools and Sandura, were not appealed to the Supreme Court.
166. See 388 U.S. at 377-78. The -Government argued that both the customer and
territorial restrictions were restraints upon alienation. The Court responded to this
contention by stating simply, "We agree." 388 U.S. at 378.
167. 220 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1911).
168. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &: Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382, 391-92 (1967)
(Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Bork, supra note 36, at 398; Elman, "Petrified
Opinions" and Competitive Realities, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 625, 629 (1966); Jordan, Ex•
elusive and Restricted Sales Areas Under the Antitrust Laws, 9 UCLA L. REv. 111,
153-54 (1962); Robinson, Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods,
45 CORNELL L Q. 254, 265-66 (1960);,-Ncite, supta note 1, at 800.
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the same product. Nor can a retailer compete effectively with merchants carrying similar products. Resale price maintenance places
a limitation on a retailer's ability to carry on his business; it prevents intrabrand competition, and takes from the retailer a substantial degree of his ability to meet interbrand competition.169
On the other hand, his ability to meet competition when he is
subject to a territorial restriction is significantly greater than when
the restriction concerns resale price maintenance. Under a territorial
restriction, a retailer can still set his price, so the restriction need
not hinder interbrand competition.170 Moreover intrabrand competition would still be possible, though perhaps unlikely. A particular
retailer could set his price so low that he would attract customers
from other territories. Vertical territorial restrictions have a much
less severe effect on both interbrand and intrabrand competition,
as well as the retailer's independence of decision-making. It is questionable whether the restraints-on-alienation rule, a doubtful rationale for the per se rule against price maintenance, should be carried
over to vertical territorial restrictions.
As Justice Stewart noted in the Schwinn dissent, it would be
better to look at the economics behind the problem than to rely
on a holdover from the common law, a rule formulated under substantially different circumstances.171 Since economic theory has
shown that vertical territorial restrictions do not necessarily have any
adverse effects on resource allocation or competition and since legal
precedents suggest that the Schwinn rule is unfounded, it would
seem appropriate for the Court to overrule Schwinn and replace
the per se rule with the rule of reason.
V.

CONCLUSION

T opco provides the Court with an occasion to dispel much of the
confusion left in the wake of Sealy and Schwinn. The Court should
take this opportunity to clarify the bounds of the per se rule against
horizontal territorial restrictions. As T opco convincingly illustrates,
there are cases in which horizontal territorial restrictions among
former noncompetitors will have little adverse effect on intrabrand
competition, yet will significantly contribute to interbrand competition. An examination of precedents in which horizontal arrangements
were declared to be unlawful shows that it is only when the agreements are among competitors that the Court has applied the per se
169. But see Bork, supra note 36, at 404-05.
170. Cf. Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
171. 388 U.S. at 391-93. See also Elman, supra note 168, at 629-34, who suggests
that the applicability of this doctrine to modern commerce, where the manufacturer
may have an interest in his property after it is sold, is not only questionable, but
wrong.
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rule. Thus, Topco should be used by the Court to limit application
of the per se rule to agreements among actual or potential competitors.
In addition to reconsidering the horizontal per se rule, the Court
should also use Topco to reject the Schwinn doctrine. The rationale
for a per se proscription in Schwinn seems to be based solely upon
the outdated rule against restraints on alienation and an economic
philosophy that is subject to substantial criticism. Although Topco
itself may not be a vertical case, it nevertheless provides an opportunity for the Court to announce a unified doctrine for all territorial restrictions. Since vertical restrictions are perhaps justifiable
in that they may have no effect on competition, and since there is
no developed case law on these restrictions, the Court should hold
that vertical territorial restrictions, as well as horizontal territorial
restrictions among noncompetitors, are to be evaluated under the
rule of reason.

